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ABSTRACT 
 
The paper examines the moderating effects of governance quality on stock liquidity and dividend relationship. 
Past empirical studies on the link between stock liquidity and dividend suggest there are mixed findings between 
them. A negative relationship suggests stock liquidity and dividend are a substitute which aligns with the liquidity 
hypothesis. On the other hand, a positive relationship between stock liquidity and dividend suggests stock liquidity 
informational effect increases a firm’s incentive to pay dividends. Moderating factors could have contributed to 
such mixed findings. Therefore, this study suggested governance quality could be one of the moderating factors 
that contributed to the inconsistency findings. Governance quality has been known to mitigate information 
asymmetry that made firm pay more dividends by formulating and promoting sound policies. Thus, this study 
aimed to ascertain the moderating factors of governance quality on the relationship between stock liquidity and 
dividend. By using a sample from 22 emerging market countries, we adopted logistic panel random effect to 
estimate the model. Adopting the governance quality measurements developed by the World Bank, our empirical 
results found that political stability, government effectiveness, regulation quality and control of corruption are 
among the factors that moderated the relationship between stock liquidity and dividend. 
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ABSTRAK 
 
Kajian ini bertujuan untuk menyiasat kesan penyederhanaan kualiti tadbir urus terhadap hubungan antara 
kecairan saham dan dividen. Kajian lepas terhadap hubugan antara kecairan saham dan dividen menunjukkan 
hubungan yang tidak konsisten. Hubungan negatif mencadangkan bahawa kecairan saham dan dividen 
berperanan sebagai pengganti. Manakala, hubungan positif mencadangkan bahawa kesan maklumat kecairan 
saham  meningkatkan insentif firma untuk membayar dividen. Faktor penyederhanaan mungkin memainkan 
peranan bagi penemuan yang berbeza.  Oleh itu, kajian ini mencadangkan kualiti tadbir urus merupakan salah 
satu faktor yang mendorong kepada penemuan yang tidak konsisten pada kajian lepas. Kualiti tadbir urus telah 
diketahui mengurangkan maklumat asimetri yang membuat firma membayar lebih dividen dengan merumuskan 
dan mengalakkan polisi yang lebih baik. Dengan mengunakan sampel dari dua puluh dua negara pesat 
membangun, kami mengunakan regresi logistik panel dengan kesan rawak untuk menganggarkan model. 
Mengunakan kualiti tadbir urus yang telah dibangunkan oleh bank dunia, kajian ini menemui kestabilan politik, 
kecekapan kerajaan, kualiti peraturan, dan kawalan rasuah merupakan antara faktor-faktor yang 
menyederhanakan hubungan antara kecairan saham dan dividen. 
 
Kata kunci: Kecairan Saham; dividen, kualiti tadbir urus; maklumat asimetri 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
At the end of each financial year, publicly listed firms must resolve whether profits should or should not be 
distributed and if so, how much of it should be in the form of dividends. Dividends are addressed by Black (1976) 
as a puzzle not only because of the way different dividend policies affect shareholders wealth differently but also 
other policies such as investment and financing. Even after more than a decade of research on dividends, the 
mystery of dividends remains unsolved like pieces of a puzzle that do not fit together (Baker, Powell & Veit 
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2002). For example, a firm that pays dividends will experience a reduction in cash and must, therefore, decide on 
how to finance their projects with the remaining sources of cash available. An optimal cash distribution is crucial 
in satisfying a shareholder’s needs while making a wise investment and financing decision without jeopardizing 
the firm’s performance. Furthermore, dividend decision is not only important among internal shareholders but 
also for the external stockholders. External stockholders demand firms pay dividends. As a result, a firm that pays 
higher dividends has higher valuation and a higher firm value. On the contrary, a firm that pays a lower dividend 
has a lower firm value due to the lower valuation among investors. This relationship is explained by the dividend 
signalling theory. Among the dividend puzzle, stock liquidity effect on dividend policy has received limited 
attention until the late 2000s. The relationship between stock liquidity and dividend was originally investigated 
by Banerjee, Gatchev and Spindt (2007) where they suggested stock liquidity and dividend are in fact substitutes 
for each other. This idea of the substitution effect between stock liquidity and dividend is derived from Miller and 
Modigliani (1961) irrelevance theory of dividend. According to the liquidity hypothesis, liquidity enables a 
homemade dividend to be created at no cost. In the real world, the cost of trading known as friction has always 
existed but rational investors still demand homemade dividend over dividend if the friction cost is lower and vice 
versa. This proposition supports the substitution effect between stock liquidity and dividend.  
 However, Jiang, Ma and Shi (2017) recently argued that the substitution effect neglects the informational 
effect brought on by stock liquidity. In general, the higher the liquidity of the stock, the greater the availability of 
stocks in the stock market. In other words, the different pricing range of stocks at different magnitudes will be 
available to meet the investors’ demands. Therefore, the more the pricing ranges are available in the stock market, 
the more the information about the firm is for the investors because each stock price contains unique information 
about the firm’s performance (Holmstrom & Tirole 1993). Furthermore, according to the microstructure literature, 
as market liquidity increases, information asymmetry reduces (Kanagaretnam, Lobo & Whalen 2007). Simply 
put, stock liquidity generates information that reduces information asymmetry and increases transparency. Under 
the condition of low transparency, tunnelling incentives among insiders are likely to be riskier. Thus, it can be 
surmised that stock liquidity has the properties of reducing information asymmetry. The reduction of information 
asymmetry also means the transparency of the firm’s information has been increased making any tunnelling 
activities that are legally riskier easily identifiable (Petrasek 2012; Li & Zhao 2008). In addition, keeping a surplus 
of retained earnings instead of allocating to external investor damages a firm’s reputation (Gomes 2000). 
Therefore, the net benefit of paying dividends will increase with better stock liquidity (La Porta et al. 2000).  
 However, past literature on stock liquidity and dividend relationship has provide mixed results, suggesting 
that empirical evidences on this relationship are inconclusive and may derived by moderating factors. The 
moderating factors can be in the form of environmental setting or structure of the organization. This study 
specifically suggests setting governance quality will moderate the relationship between stock liquidity and 
dividend. Past literature has recorded governance serves to protect shareholder rights by mitigating the perverse 
insider’s behaviour (Amer Al-Jaifi, Al-Rassas & Al-Qadasi 2017). Namely, under the condition of good 
governance, external or minority stockholders’ rights are likely to be protected and vice versa if the governance 
is weak. The strong protection for the shareholders’ rights under good governance may explain why dividends in 
the developed market countries are less likely to be volatile than the emerging market countries which have 
relatively weak governance. Furthermore, stronger governance leads to greater quality of information 
(Kanagaretnam et al. 2007). Since, quality of information leads to greater transparency of firm’s performance, the 
level of information asymmetry under good governance is likely to be low.  
 The potential moderating effects of governance on stock liquidity and dividend raise a question on how 
important governance quality in influencing stock liquidity and dividend relationship especially in emerging 
market countries. According to Lesmond (2005), emerging market experiencing a massive growth in shares traded 
which is from $15 billion to $200 billion within just 10 years. This not only happen in liquidity but also market 
capitalization which rose from $306 billion to $1.4 trillion. The increase investment in emerging market can easily 
provide a returns more 90 percent for any given year (Lesmond 2005). Although the returns in emerging market 
are substantial, it depends on the increase risk and volatility and these returns can significantly reduce by the 
reduction on liquidity of stock trading in emerging relative to developed markets (Lesmond 2005). This indicates 
that stock liquidity has substantial effect on emerging market returns relative to developed markets countries. The 
substantial difference between emerging and developed market not only affecting stock liquidity and its returns 
but also the firm’s dividend policy. 
 A substantial amount of empirical evidences in past literature shows significant differences on dividend 
policies between emerging and developed market countries. One of the early and significant articles was written 
by Glen et al. (1995). In their article using a sample across emerging market countries and the US market as a 
parallel comparison, a significant difference was found. For instances, the dividends paid in emerging market 
countries are two-third of dividend paid in developed market countries (Glen et al. 1995). They further emphasized 
that dividends paid in emerging market countries are less stable because the dividends are largely determined by 
a ratio as compared to developed market countries which largely depend on the dividend level (Glen et al. 1995). 
In addition, Aivazian, Booth and Cleary (2003) discovered that emerging market is more sensitive towards 
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financial constraints and as a results dividend paid are lower than those in developed countries which have better 
external sources of financing. Since, governance quality provides an effects to both stock liquidity and dividend 
as posit in the past literature, a country level governance should play important role in enhancing the number of 
investors by providing a better stock returns through better liquidity and much stable dividend policy via sound 
policy that protect investors rights. 
 Based on this argument, this study posits that good governance at country-level improves stock market 
liquidity by increasing the investors’ interest through greater protection of investors’ rights. This study aims to 
examines the moderating effect of governance quality on the link between stock liquidity and dividend. The effect 
of good governance in providing greater quality of information as well as a greater number of investors should 
therefore further enhance the level of information brought on by stock liquidity. Furthermore, the quality of 
governance and its attributes have been studied and found to influence the level of information asymmetry 
(Elbadry, Gounopoulos & Skinner 2015; Cormier et al. 2010; Flaherty, Li & Small 2007). In short, governance 
quality has been found in past studies to have a significant effect on the level of information asymmetry, increased 
the number of investors’ participation through greater protection, improved the quality of information delivered 
as well as greater transparency. Thus, based on these criteria this study suggests governance quality through its 
mechanism moderates the relationship between stock liquidity and dividend.  
This paper is unique from past literature in two ways. First, the study examines the moderating effect of 
governance quality on the relationship between stock liquidity and dividend. Secondly, the study examines the 
relationship between stock liquidity and dividend across twenty-two emerging market countries for generalization, 
which is limited in the past studies. This study finds that political stability, government effectiveness, regulation 
quality and control of corruption are among the dimensions in governance quality that significantly moderate the 
relationship between stock liquidity and dividend. Also, this study finds that governance quality using aggregate 
average score does indeed moderate the relationship between stock liquidity and dividend. The next section of the 
paper reviews the literature and formulate the hypothesis, followed by the explanation of the data and research 
method, discussion of empirical findings and managerial implication of the study. The final section of the study 
concludes the overall study and highlights the limitation as well as future research recommendations.  
 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
The rise of globalization has caused country-level governance to become one of the most prevalence and crucial 
issues in the world of finance (Low, Tee & Kew 2015). The world financial crisis further drives the belief on the 
importance of governance quality in influencing financial system (Low et al. 2015). According to Kaufmann, 
Kraay and Mastruzzi (2010), governance is “the traditions and institutions by which authority in a country is 
exercised. This includes the process by which government selected, monitored, and replaced; the capacity of the 
government to effectively formulate and implement sound policies; and the respect of citizens and the state for 
the institutions that govern the economic and social interactions among them”. Past works of literature have 
emphasized the importance of interplay presence between governance at country-level as well as at firm-level 
framework (Low et al. 2015). Therefore, assessment at firm-level governance is a good starting point for regulators 
to gain more insight on the effect of country-level governance on stock market risk since both simultaneously 
interact and neither firm- nor country-level can function properly on its own (Low et al. 2015). For over a decade, 
researchers have identified the quality of governance at country-level has a deep influence on corporate policies 
and financial market operations through its hold on the accessibility of stock market performance, cost of capital, 
corporate valuations, investment quality and external financing (Hail Leuz 2006; Daouk, Lee & Ng 2006; Hopper 
et al. 2009; Yartey 2010; Giannetti & Koskinen 2010; Chiou, Lee & Lee 2010; Low et al. 2011). The deep 
influences of governance quality on corporate policies as well as stock market performances may potentially 
control the relationship between stock liquidity and dividend.  
Governance is well noted for its effect on mitigating information asymmetry in a number of empirical studies 
(Kanagaretnam et al. 2007; Cormier et al. 2010; Elbadry et al. 2015). In addition, past studies have documented 
there is a positive association between governance effectiveness and market liquidity (Amer Al-Jaifi et al. 2017; 
Ali et al. 2016; Karmani, Ajina & Boussaada 2015; Chung, Elder & Kim 2010). Good governance quality is very 
important in order to increase investors’ confidence, including broadening and deepening its capital market (Amer 
Al-Jaifi et al. 2017). Furthermore, effective governance serves to protect shareholders’ rights by reducing the 
perverse insiders’ behaviour (Amer Al-Jaifi et al. 2017). This is in-line with other empirical studies that posit 
strong governance persuades internal shareholders to pay more dividends (Mitton 2004; Petrasek 2012). In 
addition, past study also finds that firm with better governance pay more dividend, however, this relationship is 
only significant in countries with minimal shareholder protection rights (Chang et al. 2018). Furthermore, past 
study also finds that strong governance not only serves to protect the rights of shareholders but also delivers a 
good quality of information (Kanagaretnam et al. 2007). The attributes of governance increase the quality of 
information delivered, protect shareholders’ rights and increase investors’ level of confidence. Good governance 
quality attracts more investors not just from local but also foreign markets which will eventually improve domestic 
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market liquidity. Based on these arguments, this study postulates that governance quality at countries-level 
moderates the relationship between stock liquidity and dividend. To measure country-level governance, the World 
Bank has developed six indicators to assess six dimensions of governance quality in a country. The six dimensions 
include voice and accountability, political stability, government effectiveness, regulations quality, rule of law and 
control of corruption. 
 
MODERATING EFFECT OF VOICE AND ACCOUNTABILITY 
 
Voice and accountability are important components of governance because both government and citizens play a 
vital role in implementing the governance that works for the poor and the same time enhances democracy 
(Krishnan & Teo 2012). According to Goetz and Jenkins (2001, 2002), voice can be defined as a variability; 
informal as well as formal mechanism, in which people express their preferences, opinions and views, while 
accountability as the nature of relationship between two different parties. According to Kaufmann, Kray and 
Zoido-Lobotan (1999), voice and accountability canter on freedom of expression, political rights and electoral 
expression. In the context of stock market liquidity, voice and accountability enable investors to participate in 
channelling their voice on what is expected of governments in regards to stock market performances and the 
governments’ accountability in providing a better environment like policies which align with the voice of the 
citizens (e.g. investors). Based on this point, this study posits that: 
 
H1 Voice and accountability positively moderate the relationship between stock liquidity and dividend.  
 
MODERATING EFFECT OF POLITICAL STABILITY 
 
According to Kaufmann et al. (1999), political stability concerns the probability of domestic violence and 
terrorism, a premature takeover of government and obligatory stability in policies. In other words, political 
stability can be referred to as the magnitude of turbulence in a country (Meso, Datta & Mbarika 2006). Political 
instability might affect stock liquidity in a way that reduces the number of foreign as well as local investors’ 
interests in investing in the country. According to Krishnan and Teo (2012), large theoretical studies suggest 
political instability will adversely affect the growth of economies. Countries with a relatively unstable political 
condition tend to adopt inefficient and less optimal policies such as excessive government consumption, 
inefficient selection of tax system and massive accumulation of external debt which eventually affect the growth 
of economies in a bad way (Cukierman, Edwards & Tabellini 1992). Sadowsky (1993, 1996) on one hand 
associates political stability with the level of foreign direct investment as well as the risk in involving with such 
investment. According to Sadowsky (1993, 1996), the greater the degree of turbulence, the greater the risk of 
investment in the country. Furthermore, according to Meso (2006), the level of political stability might influence 
the degree of involvement from local citizens towards engaging in productive economic activities. For instances, 
under the conditions of lower political stability, local citizens might invest their productive resources in the 
countries which provide greater returns with a stable environment or in assets that protect them against the loss of 
wealth (Meso 2006). Since the magnitude of political stability affects the number of foreign as well as local 
investors, this study posits:  
 
H2 Political stability positively moderates the relationship between stock liquidity and dividend.  
 
MODERATING EFFECT OF GOVERNMENT EFFECTIVENESS 
 
Government objectives can range from economics to social perspectives (Srivastava & Teo 2007). According to 
Kaufmann et al. (1999), the economic objectives of the government emphasize competitiveness. On the other 
hand, social objectives are concerned with improving the social lives of citizens by minimizing inequalities as 
well as poverty. This objective can only be achieved if the government are committed to its stakeholders in 
providing the goods and services (Kaufmann et al. 1999). Krishnan and Teo (2012) further emphasize, to achieve 
such objectives the government must be effective in creating and implementing good system and policies. In the 
context of stock market liquidity, government effectiveness not only helps in minimizing the inequalities by 
promoting rights protections for minority shareholders but also in attracting more foreign investors by increasing 
the confidence of investors towards the government’s effectiveness in such rights protection (Amer Al-Jaifi et al. 
2017). Thus, this study posits that: 
 
H3 Government effectiveness positively moderates the relationship between stock liquidity and dividend. 
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MODERATING EFFECT OF REGULATION QUALITY 
 
Regulations quality can be referred to as regulatory framework that focuses on unfriendly market policies such as 
price controls, lack of supervision from banks and the burden of extreme regulations in specific areas such as 
business development and foreign trades (Kaufmann et al. 1999). In addition, Radaelli (2007) asserts the target of 
regulatory performance improvement includes reduction of burden, cost-effective regulation and improvement on 
the reliance over market-friendly alternatives towards regulations. In the context of stock market liquidity, 
regulations quality can improve stock liquidity by promoting market-friendly policies such as a greater financial 
market openness that attracts both foreign and local investors. According to Lee and Chou (2018), financial market 
openness facilitates operation of the domestic financial institution, eases the reduction of capital cost and attracts 
a greater number of investors which would eventually improve the magnitude of capital market liquidity. Based 
on this argument, this study posits that: 
 
H4 Regulations quality positively moderates the relationship between stock liquidity and dividend.  
 
MODERATING EFFECT OF RULE OF LAW 
 
According to Kaufmann et al. (1999), rule of law can be referred to as the degree in which agents have assurance 
in and abide by the rules of society. These include the predictability and effectiveness of the judiciary, insights on 
the occurrence of misconducts and contract enforceability. In other words, these dimensions of governance 
concern the degree of achievement by society as a whole in developing a setting where fair and foreseeable rules 
are the basis for the social and economic interactions and emphatically, protection of property rights (Krishnan & 
Teo 2012). The emphasis on the protection of property rights improves investors’ interest in the country. 
According to Brockman and Chung (2003), the main difference between liquidity across countries is the poor 
protection of shareholders. In other words, countries with poor shareholders protection tend to have lower liquidity 
with weak participation from investors. Under such condition of poor protection, investors will not be interested 
to invest in that country. Furthermore, Dumitrescu (2010) highlights that governance would affect market liquidity 
by improving the effectiveness of shareholders’ protection that leads to greater liquidity. Since rule of law 
emphasizes on improving the fair and foreseeable rule as well as achieving greater shareholders’ protection, this 
study suggests that a greater rule of law will lead to greater market liquidity through an increase in the number of 
participants. Thus, this study posits:   
 
H5 Rule of law positively moderates the relationship between stock liquidity and dividend.  
 
MODERATING EFFECT OF CONTROL OF CORRUPTION 
 
According to Ojha, Palvia and Gupta (2008), corruption is a complex term that has various connotations. 
Corruption can be defined as the acts in which a public official is used for personal benefits that contradict the 
rules of the game. United Nations Office on Drug and Crime (UNODC 2004) has classified corruption into several 
forms; embezzlement, bribery, abuse of discretion, theft, extortion, favouritism, improper political contribution 
and exploiting conflicting interests. Corruption can be seen as a problem of information asymmetric and incentives 
through the principal and agent model (Klitgaard 1988). The principal in this model is the honest government 
public official while the person in charge of public servants is the agent and the one responsible for delivery of 
services to businesses and citizens is the client. This model predicts that when a public official has a monopoly of 
control and operates with a lack of accountability, problems of corruption will arise when there is information 
asymmetric between principals and clients, in which the agents have more information about administration than 
the principal and clients. In the context of market liquidity, control of corruption should therefore further reduce 
the level of monopoly and information asymmetric by the principal and increase the level of transparency and 
incentives for a firm to pay dividends. Therefore, this study posits: 
 
H6 Control of corruption positively moderates the relationship between stock liquidity and dividend.  
 
Despite lots of empirical evidence supporting the positive association between governance quality and 
dividend in the past literature, there are also several studies suggesting the negative tone on association between 
governance and dividend. For example, La Porta et al. (2000) provide two hypothesis namely outcome and 
substitute, where outcome hypothesis predicted positive association between governance and dividend. On 
contrary, the substitute hypothesis predicted negative association between governance and dividend. In substitute 
hypothesis, firms use dividend as a substitute for weak governance in order to maintain a good relationship with 
shareholders. Jiang et al. (2017) indicate a negative tone of governance quality by arguing that weak governance 
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provides more room for informational effect of stock liquidity to influence dividend policy. Since, there are two 
possible relationships between governance and dividend, the study may not necessarily find the positive 
moderating effect of governance quality and on contrary may find the negative tone of governance quality that 
supporting substitute hypothesis as predicted by La Porta et al. (2000). Figure 1 explains the overall pictures of 
research framework in this study 
 
 
FIGURE 1. Research framework 
 
 
METHODOLOGY 
 
The data for this study were sourced from Datastream, Thomsan Reuters and World Bank Database. The sample 
comprised of 3398 firms listed in emerging market countries with a total of 22551 firm-year observations. The 
emerging market countries selected for this study consisted of 22 countries as listed by the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF) excluding China which found to be an outlier for several variables in the study. The listed countries 
include Argentina, Bulgaria, Brazil, Bangladesh, Colombia, Chile, Hungary, Indonesia, India, Mexico, Malaysia, 
Peru, Poland, Pakistan, Philippines, Romania, Russia, South Africa, Thailand, Turkey, Ukraine and Venezuela. 
This study covered 10 years of observations which ranged from the year 2006 to 2015. The study chooses to start 
from the year of 2006 onwards is because there are some missing data on governance quality from the previous 
year. All firms from each country were included except firms with incomplete financial data, firms in the financial 
sectors and firms with less than 30-trading days in a year. The collected data were analysed using Panel Data 
Logistic regression model. The study used the propensity to pay dividend (DIV) which takes value of 1 if firm 
pay dividend and 0 otherwise whereas proportion of zero absolute return (LESMOND) as a proxy for liquidity. 
The reason for choosing LESMOND measurement as the main proxy was because according to Lesmond et al. 
(1999), stock with high friction will have less frequent price movement and have greater zero returns than 
securities with much lower transaction costs. Thus, the occurrence of zero was used as a measure of illiquidity. 
Since the higher value of LESMOND illiquidity ratio indicates a lower level of liquidity, we multiplied the value 
by -1 for ease of interpretation. The moderating variables of the study consisted of six variables which were 
 
 
                                                                             
 
              
                                                                
                                                                
 
 
 
CONTROL VARIABLES:  
 SIZE 
 ROA 
 GROWH OPPORTUNITIES 
 LEVERAGE 
 
MODERATOR VARIABLES: 
 GOVERNANCE QUALITY 
 VOICE AND ACCOUNTABILITY 
 POLITICAL STABILITY 
 GOVERNMENT EFFECTIVENESS 
 REGULATORY QUALITY 
 RULE OF LAW 
 CONTROL OF CORRUPTION 
INDEPENDENT 
VARIABLE:  
 
STOCK LIQUIDITY 
 
DEPENDENT 
VARIABLE:  
 
DIVIDEND PAYOUT 
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collected from the World Bank database. The six variables are voice and accountability, political stability, 
government effectiveness, regulations quality, rule of law and control of corruption. Whereas the selected control 
variables are firm size, profitability, growth opportunities and leverage. The study also added three fixed effects 
to control the variability effect of different countries, industry and year fixed effect using dummy variables. The 
variables were estimated using the following models: 
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Where dividend payout is denoted as firm cash dividend over earnings for DIV β2 represented Lesmond 
liquidity ratio. β3 is denoted as governance quality dimension namely VA, PS, GE, RQ, RL and CC for each 
different equation respectively. β4 is denoted as the moderating variable or interaction term between six 
dimensions of governance quality namely voice and accountability (Liquidity*VA), political stability 
(Liquidity*PS), government effectiveness (Liquidity*GE), regulation quality (Liquidity*RQ), Rule of Law 
(Liquidity*RL) and control of corruption (Liquidity*CC) with liquidity ratio.  β5, β6, β7, and β8 were denoted as 
control variables namely firm size, profitability, growth opportunities (Tobin’s Q) and leverage; each obtained 
from DataStream. Last but not least, -  is represented by country fixed effect, .  industry fixed effects, and /0 
is represented by year fixed effects, whereas 1 is represented by error term. 
 
RESULTS 
 
Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics of the variables used in the study excluding the dummy variables. To 
ensure the robustness of our results, several diagnostic tests were performed. Table 2 presents the correlation 
analysis. Based on Table 2, several variables indicate high correlation. For instance, the interaction term 
“Liquidity*CC” has a very high correlation value of 0.95 with “Liquidity*RL”. Liquidity*PS and lnSize are 
categorized under the low correlation values of 0.30 to 0.50. Besides the correlation matrix analysis, the study 
also used the Variance Inflation Factor (VIF). Based on Table 3, the highest VIF is 21.18 and the mean VIF is 
7.29. There are eight variables with VIF values larger than 4.0 and four of them are the interaction terms namely 
Liquidity*GE, Liquidity*RQ, Liquidity*RL and Liquidity*CC. The correlation coefficient above 0.6 and VIF score 
above 4.0 are considered large (Hair et al. 2010). Thus, to overcome this problem, the study analysed each of the 
interaction terms separately to avoid multicollinearity and bias results. In other words, there was six separate 
analysis that examined the moderating factor of governance in six different dimensions. When the six proxies for 
governance were examined in six separate analysis, the VIF and correlation indeed did not rise above 4.0 and 0.60 
respectively which solved the multicollinearity issues (See Appendix: Table 12 to 18). This means the construct 
is truly distinct from each other and multicollinearity issues do not exist when the interactions term are examined 
individually. Furthermore, according to Hair, Ringle and Sarstedt (2013), although there is theoretical support for 
multiple moderators, researchers should analyse one moderator at a time to sustain the interpretability of the 
results. This further justifies why this study analysed the interaction terms individually and not as a group. 
 
TABLE 1. Descriptive statistics 
Variables Observations Mean Std. Dev.  Maximum Minimum 
Dividend Payout 22551 0.685 0.464 0.000 1.000 
GA
LL
EY
 PR
OO
F
Jurnal Pengurusan 57(2019)Galley Proof 
ISSN 0127-2713 Scopus, Cabell, ASEAN Citation Index (ACI) and MyCite Indexes 
8 
 
Liquidity 22551 0.051 0.967 -11.213 0.616 
VA 22551 0.033 1.002 -2.352 2.002 
PS 22551 -0.021 0.992 -2.920 2.466 
GE 22551 -0.025 0.988 -2.921 2.049 
RQ 22551 -0.024 1.002 -3.806 2.965 
RL 22551 -0.009 1.004 -5.082 3.459 
CC 22551 -0.017 1.014 -2.788 4.272 
Liquidity*VA 22551 0.165 1.138 -22.420 20.468 
Liquidity*PS 22551 -0.199 1.153 -20.731 32.602 
Liquidity*GE 22551 -0.214 1.176 -22.978 23.542 
Liquidity*RQ 22551 -0.230 1.313 -32.518 26.114 
Liquidity*RL 22551 -0.100 1.566 -36.331 34.140 
Liquidity*CC 22551 -0.163 1.682 -42.974 22.577 
Log (Size) 22551 15.019 2.558 6.390 23.350 
Log (ROA) 22551 1.565 1.389 -9.166 6.476 
Growth 22551 1.496 1.832 -0.084 163.546 
Leverage 22551 46.302 22.388 -27.888 229.253 
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TABLE 2. Correlation analysis 
Variable 
Didend 
payout 
Liquidi
ty VA PS GE RQ RL CC 
Liquidi
ty*VA 
Liquidi
ty*PS 
Liquidi
ty*GE 
Liquidi
ty*RQ 
Liquidi
ty*RL 
Liquidi
ty*CC 
Log 
(Size) 
Log 
(ROA) Growth 
Levera
ge 
Dividend Payout 1.00                  
Liquidity 0.08 1.00                 
VA -0.07 0.17 1.00                
PS 0.00 -0.21 0.07 1.00               
GE 0.02 -0.22 -0.22 0.77 1.00              
RQ 0.03 -0.24 -0.11 0.76 0.82 1.00             
RL 0.00 -0.10 0.25 0.69 0.81 0.72 1.00            
CC 0.02 -0.17 0.20 0.79 0.80 0.87 0.87 1.00           
Liquidity*VA -0.02 -0.02 -0.07 -0.03 0.00 -0.10 -0.04 -0.12 1.00          
Liquidity*PS 0.00 0.27 -0.03 -0.11 -0.14 -0.09 -0.18 -0.15 0.45 1.00         
Liquidity*GE -0.03 0.26 0.01 -0.13 -0.19 -0.13 -0.22 -0.19 0.25 0.81 1.00        
Liquidity*RQ -0.03 0.39 -0.08 -0.08 -0.12 -0.11 -0.21 -0.17 0.47 0.79 0.85 1.00       
Liquidity*RL -0.04 0.15 -0.03 -0.14 -0.17 -0.17 -0.22 -0.22 0.57 0.79 0.88 0.87 1.00      
Liquidity*CC -0.04 0.25 -0.08 -0.11 -0.13 -0.14 -0.21 -0.21 0.63 0.81 0.83 0.91 0.95 1.00     
Log (Size) 0.26 0.13 0.13 -0.24 -0.34 -0.21 -0.30 -0.23 -0.11 0.07 0.06 -0.01 0.00 -0.04 1.00    
Log (ROA) 0.26 0.18 0.08 -0.08 0.02 -0.02 0.12 0.05 -0.01 -0.03 -0.06 -0.06 -0.07 -0.06 -0.22 1.00   
Growth 0.11 0.07 0.03 -0.04 -0.07 -0.04 -0.06 -0.03 -0.02 0.03 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.08 0.19 1.00  
Leverage -0.13 0.14 0.23 -0.16 -0.21 -0.22 -0.09 -0.13 0.00 0.03 0.05 0.03 0.04 0.02 0.20 -0.09 -0.01 1.00 
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TABLE 3. VIF analysis 
Variable VIF 1/VIF 
Liquidity*CC 21.180 0.047 
Liquidity*RL 20.100 0.050 
Liquidity*GE 12.420 0.081 
CC 11.910 0.084 
GE 10.640 0.094 
Liquidity*RQ 9.580 0.104 
RL 9.260 0.108 
RQ 7.230 0.138 
Liquidity*PS 3.930 0.254 
Liquidity*VA 3.770 0.265 
PS 3.740 0.268 
VA 3.390 0.295 
Liquidity 1.970 0.507 
Log (Size) 1.350 0.739 
Log (ROA) 1.250 0.800 
Leverage 1.150 0.872 
Growth 1.060 0.942 
Mean VIF 7.290  
 
To alleviate the concerns for both potential heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation the study apply robust 
standard errors (Huber White sandwich estimator) in each model to solve for this problem. 
 
RANDOM EFFECT LOGISTIC REGRESSION ESTIMATION 
 
In Table 4 to Table 6, the study applies random effect logistic regression as the main method to estimate the model. 
Since the outcome of the variable is coded 0, 1 and there is little variation in outcome that change overtime, the 
study chooses random effect logistic regression over the fixed effect. This is because, the fixed effect regression 
analysis cannot asses the effect of variables that have little within group variation. Since the data from the study 
does not vary much from on year to the next, the study will have more observation and instruments when using 
random effect analysis. Since estimating multiple interaction terms simultaneously resulted in high 
multicollinearity, the study examined each of the governance quality dimension individually in separate analyses. 
Each dimension will be examined separately and classify into model I until model VI. Table 4 to Table 6 from 
each model shows the moderating effect for each individual analysis from the six different dimensions. From the 
six dimensions, four interaction terms show significant and negative relationship namely political stability, 
government effectiveness, regulation quality and control of corruptions. The first interaction term with significant 
results is Liquidity*PS which represents the moderating role of political stability with a z-value of -2.81 and a p-
value of 0.005. The second interaction term with significant results is Liquidity*GE which represents the 
moderating role of government effectiveness with a z-value of -2.54 and a p-value of 0.011. The third interaction 
term is Liquidity*RQ which represents the moderating role of regulation quality with a z-value of - 2.91 and a p-
value of 0.004. The final and fourth interaction term is Liquidity*CC which represents the moderating effect of 
control of corruption with a z-value of -2.5 and a p-value of 0.013. The remaining interaction terms Liquidity*VA 
and Liquidity*RL each represent voice and accountability and rule of law are not significant with a p-value larger 
than 0.05. All these analyses are robust after applying standard errors calculation to counter for potential both 
heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation.  
The significant negative moderating effect of governance quality indicate that the presence of high 
governance quality lowering dividend payout. This finding is aligned with La Porta et al. (2000) substitute 
hypothesis. According to La Porta et al. (2000) substitute hypothesis, firm will use dividend as a substitute for 
weak governance in order to maintain a good relationship with shareholders. This may explain why the presence 
of higher governance quality negatively moderates the relationship between stock liquidity and dividend. 
Furthermore, Jiang et al. (2017) argued that weak governance makes more room for stock liquidity informational 
effect to influence dividend payout. In other words, the presence of good governance to mitigate information 
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asymmetry makes the informational effect of stock liquidity become less significant resulting a negative 
moderating effect of governance quality on stock liquidity and dividend relationship. In short, the presence of 
good governance quality may not necessarily improve dividend payout, but they may use dividend as a substitute 
for a weaker governance in order to maintain a good relationship with their shareholder as posit by substitute 
hypothesis by La Porta et al. (2000). 
 
TABLE 4. Moderating effect of voice and accountability and moderating effect of political stability (Robust 
standard errors) 
Variables 
(Model I)   (Model II) 
Moderating Effect of Voice and 
Accountability 
Variables 
Moderating Effect of Political 
Stability 
Dividend  
Payout 
COEF z-value p-value 
Dividend 
Payout 
COEF z-value p-value 
Liquidity 0.108 2.380 0.017 Liquidity 0.109 2.460 0.014 
VA -0.150 -0.740 0.462 PS 0.272 1.630 0.102 
Liquidity*VA 0.013 0.300 0.767 Liquidity*PS -0.085 -2.810 0.005 
Log (Size) 1.423 24.140 0.000 Log (Size) 1.432 24.230 0.000 
Log (ROA) 0.546 13.240 0.000 Log (ROA) 0.548 13.290 0.000 
Growth 0.206 4.990 0.000 Growth 0.205 5.040 0.000 
Leverage -0.048 -15.840 0.000 Leverage -0.048 -15.880 0.000 
Country                                                   Fixed effect included 
Industry                                                   Fixed effect included 
Year                                                   Fixed effect included 
 
TABLE 5. Moderating effect of government effectiveness and regulations quality (Robust standard errors) 
Variables 
(Model III)   (Model IV) 
Moderating Effect of Government 
Effectiveness 
Variables 
Moderating Effect of 
Regulations Quality 
Dividend  
Payout 
COEF z-value p-value 
Dividend  
Payout 
COEF z-value p-value 
Liquidity 0.108 2.390 0.017 Liquidity 0.138 2.980 0.003 
GE 0.655 3.940 0.000 RQ -0.208 -1.130 0.257 
Liquidity*GE -0.086 -2.540 0.011 Liquidity*RQ -0.104 -2.910 0.004 
Log (Size) 1.436 24.250 0.000 Log (Size) 1.423 24.300 0.000 
Log (ROA) 0.547 13.260 0.000 Log (ROA) 0.547 13.250 0.000 
Growth 0.207 4.910 0.000 Growth 0.207 4.960 0.000 
Leverage -0.049 -16.070 0.000 Leverage -0.048 -15.870 0.000 
Country                                                   Fixed effect included 
Industry                                                   Fixed effect included 
Year                                                   Fixed effect included 
 
TABLE 6. Moderating effect of rule of law and control of corruption (Robust standard errors) 
Variables 
(Model V)   (Model VI) 
Moderating Effect of Rule of Law Variables 
Moderating Effect of Control of 
Corruption 
Dividend  
Payout 
COEF z-value p-value 
Dividend  
Payout 
COEF z-value p-value 
Liquidity 0.090 2.070 0.039 Liquidity 0.096 2.170 0.030 
RL 0.265 1.390 0.164 CC 0.066 0.490 0.627 
Liquidity*RL -0.050 -1.780 0.075 Liquidity*CC -0.074 -2.500 0.013 
Log (Size) 1.433 24.290 0.000 Log (Size) 1.433 24.360 0.000 
Log (ROA) 0.547 13.260 0.000 Log (ROA) 0.548 13.300 0.000 
Growth 0.206 4.950 0.000 Growth 0.206 5.010 0.000 
Leverage -0.048 -15.890 0.000 Leverage -0.048 -15.870 0.000 
Country                                                   Fixed effect included 
GA
LL
EY
 PR
OO
F
 
12 
 
Industry                                                   Fixed effect included 
Year                                                   Fixed effect included 
 
OVERALL SCORES (AGGREGATE AVERAGE SCORES OF GOVERNANCE QUALITY) 
 
The documented significant negative moderating effects of governance quality dimensions may drive by our 
choice on how to examine the moderating effects of governance quality. To alleviate this concern, we consider 
using aggregate average score of governance quality as alternative measure. Furthermore, according to Srinidhi, 
He and Firth (2014), the use of aggregate reduces the measurement error that is inherent in the use of any one 
structural variable. To obtain overall score of governance quality in that country we added together all six proxies 
to create average aggregate score of each country to proxy for governance quality. Table 7 reports the alternative 
measures of governance quality in the form aggregate average (GQ). Based on the table 7, the results show that 
interaction term “Liquidity*GQ” as alternative measures of governance quality in the form of aggregate average 
score negatively moderates the relationship between stock liquidity and dividend with z-value of -2.37. 
 
TABLE 7. The moderating effect of governance quality on the relationship between stock liquidity  
and dividend across emerging market countries (Robust standard errors) 
Dividend  
Payout 
COEF z-value P-value 
Liquidity 0.0980384 2.2 
1.18 
-2.37 
24.33 
13.29 
4.98 
-15.9 
0.028 
0.237 
0.018 
0.000 
0.000 
0.000 
0.000 
GQ 0.2446852 
Liquidity*GQ -0.0712086 
Log (Size) 1.434494 
Log (ROA) 0.5480313 
Growth 0.2060145 
Leverage -0.048376 
Country Fixed effect included 
Industry Fixed effect included 
Year Fixed effect included 
 
ROBUSTNESS TESTS FOR ENDOGENEITY - OMITTED VARIABLES (FIRM FIXED EFFECTS 
REGRESSION) 
 
TABLE 8. Robustness tests for endogeneity - omitted variables 
Dividend  
Payout 
 
COEF Z P>z 
Lesmond 0.0013927 2.69 0.007 
GQ 0.5055078 1.29 0.198 
Lesmond*GQ -0.0851445 -2.39 0.017 
Log(size) 1.528738 15.22 0.000 
Log(roa) 0.3510923 10.55 0.000 
Growth 0.2025331 6.3 0.000 
leverage -0.0445122 -14.14 0.000 
 0.0013927 2.69 0.007 
Year  Fixed effect included 
 
To ensure the results are not influenced by the bias from the omitted variables, the study used the firm fixed effect 
regression analysis. As mentioned before, the data has little variation over time. So, the fixed effect analysis is 
inappropriate for data estimation. However, the inclusion of fixed effect that controls the time-invariant attributes 
may eliminate the cross-sectional relationship between stock liquidity and dividend payout. This may be 
associated with the omitted explanatory variables (Jiang et al. 2017). Therefore, the use of firm fixed effect 
regression should minimise the risk of omitted variable bias. Based on Table 8, the interaction between the 
Lesmond ratio and GQ has z-value of -2.39 and p-value of 0.017. The results are robust and statistically significant 
at 0.01% level using the fixed effect regression analysis.  
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ROBUSTNESS TESTS FOR ENDOGENEITY – REVERSE CAUSALITY (TWO STEP SYSTEM 
GENERALIZED METHOD OF MOMENTS) 
 
TABLE 9. Robustness tests for endogeneity – reverse causality 
Variables Coef Z P>z 
Dividend Payout (lag) 0.6869538 12.14 0.000 
Lesmond 0.0000831 2.26 0.024 
GQ -0.0323678 -1.03 0.301 
Lesmond*GQ -0.0033303 -2.15 0.031 
Log(size) 0.0234774 4.3 0.000 
Log (ROA) 0.0438422 7.29 0.000 
Growth -0.0008372 -0.64 0.525 
Leverage -0.0009652 -4.41 0.000 
Year Fixed effect included 
Country Fixed effect included 
Industry Fixed effect included 
3rd order serial correlation (p-value) 0.186 
Differences Sargan test (p-value) 0.302 
Differences Hansen test (p-value) 0.800 
 
To ensure the results are not influenced by the bias from the reverse causality in the case of firm preferences over 
dividend payout are independent from the level of stock liquidity the study adopts the twostep system Generalized 
Method of Moment system (GMM) using aggregate average score of governance quality for overall picture of 
endogenous issue in this model. The study use xtabond2 command with orthogonal robust to solve for potential 
heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation problem. Based on Table 9, the interaction between the Lesmond ratio and 
GQ has z-value of -2.15 and p-value of 0.031. The model with lag of two was suffered from 2nd order of serial 
correlation, and therefore, the study use lag three, to improve the results as shown in the table 9. As a results, the 
study can reject the null hypothesis at 3rd serial correlation with p-value of 0.186. The table also shows that the 
instrument use in this model are valid and do not suffer from overidentification as shown by the Sargan and 
Hansen test with p-value of 0.302 and 0.800 respectively. This value indicate that this model is valid. The 
persistent significant negative moderating effect of governance quality on stock liquidity and dividend also 
indicate that the results are robust even after considering the endogeneity on reverse causality. 
 
MANAGERIAL IMPLICATION 
 
The empirical findings in this study can be used as a guidance by the investor in understanding and assessing the 
effect of governance quality in determining their preferences on stock liquidity or dividend. Specifically, the fund 
managers or investors can adopt the investment diversification strategy based on the preferences on governance 
strength in that country. Since, the strong governance provides less room for informational effect to influence 
dividend policies, investors or funds manager may less rely on stock liquidity informational effect to determine 
dividend policies but rather treating stock liquidity as a substitute (supporting liquidity hypothesis). On contrary, 
if the governance quality is weak a firm may use stock liquidity (informational effect) as a determinant of dividend 
policy as there are more room (significant effect) for stock liquidity to influence dividend policy under the 
condition of high information asymmetry (weak governance).  
 
CONCLUSION 
 
This paper investigates the moderating role of governance quality on the link between stock liquidity and dividend 
of emerging market countries from the year 2006 to 2015 using logistic panel random effects estimation model. 
Based on empirical results, the study shows that political stability, government effectiveness, regulation quality 
and control of corruption are among the factors that moderate the relationship between stock liquidity and 
dividend. Furthermore, the results also negatively significant using aggregate average score of governance quality. 
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Surprisingly the results do not support the positive moderating effect as per the hypotheses but rather are negative 
with significant effect.  
Since the higher proxy of governance quality measures the better quality of governance, it is reasonable that 
governance quality dimensions negatively moderate the positive relationship between stock liquidity and 
dividend. This is because weak governance provides the room for informational effects of stock liquidity On the 
other hand, strong governance quality reduces the room for informational effects of stock liquidity. Furthermore, 
substitute hypothesis posit that firm use dividend as a substitute for weak governance to maintain a good 
relationship with shareholders. In other words, the weaker the governance quality, the more dividend paid to 
substitute the weak governance in order to maintain a good relationship with their shareholder. Thus, this may 
explain why political stability, government effectiveness, regulation quality, control of corruption and aggregate 
average score of governance quality negatively moderate the relationship between stock liquidity and dividend.  
In short, this study contributes to the body of knowledge in two ways. First, while the link between stock 
liquidity and dividend is well established in past literature, assessing the factors that contribute to mixed findings 
is limited by the lack of research. Given this condition, this study examines the moderating factors that may 
contribute to the inconsistent findings by examining the moderating role of governance quality. Secondly, 
understanding the informational effect within emerging market environment setting helps outsiders to have a 
better understanding of the real reasons for dividend payouts and enables them to make a better decision with 
regards to the preferences on stock liquidity and dividend.  
Future research should emphasize on examining governance quality at firm level to understand how 
governance quality react differently or similarly to stock liquidity and dividend relationship at country level. In 
addition, the comparison between governance quality dimension and aggregate average score of governance 
quality at firm level can be added as additional investigation. 
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APPENDIX A 
 
TABLE 10. Construct definition 
Construct  Definition  
Dividend Payout Takes value of one if firm pay dividend and zero 
otherwise 
Liquidity (LESMOND) Proportion of zero absolute return 
Log of Size Firm size measure by natural logarithm of total assets.  
Log of Return on Asset (ROA) Firm profitability measure calculated as natural 
logarithm of net income over total asset  
Growth (Tobin’ Q)  Firm growth measure as market value of equity plus 
book value of total asset minus book value of equity, 
dividend by book value of total assets  
Leverage  Firm leverage measure as the ratio of total liabilities 
over total assets  
Countries Fixed Effect Dummy variable equal to one for different types of 
countries 
Industries Fixed Effect Dummy variable equal to one for different types of 
industries  
Year Fixed Effect  Dummy variable equal to one for each different year  
 
 
TABLE 11. Governance dimensions, description, and concepts measured 
Dimension Description Concepts measured 
 
Voice and accountability Captures the extent to which a 
country’s citizens are able to 
participate in selecting their 
government, as well as freedom of 
expression, freedom of 
association, and a free media. 
 
1. Accountability of public 
officials 
2. Freedom of political 
participation 
3. Transparency of economic 
policy 
 
Political stability Measures the likelihood that the 
government will be destabilized or 
overthrown by unconstitutional or 
violent means, including domestic 
violence and terrorism. 
 
1. Government stability 
2. Internal and external conflicts 
3. Frequency of political killings 
 
Government effectiveness Captures the quality of the civil 
service and the degree of its 
independence from political 
pressures, the quality of policy 
formulation and implementation, 
and the credibility of the 
government’s commitment to such 
policies. 
 
1. Institutional effectiveness 
2. Bureaucratic quality 
3. Quality of public administration 
Regulatory quality Captures the ability of the 
government to formulate and 
implement sound policies and 
regulations that permit and 
promote development. 
 
1. Administrative regulations 
2. Business regulatory 
environment 
3. Trade policy 
 
Rule of law Captures the extent to which agents 
have confidence in and abide by 
the rules of society, and in 
particular the quality of contract 
enforcement, property rights, the 
1. Property rights 
2. Law and order 
3. Law enforcement 
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police, and the courts, as well as 
the likelihood of crime and 
violence. 
 
Control of corruption Captures the extent to which public 
power is exercised for private gain, 
including both petty and grand 
forms of corruption, as well as 
“capture” of the state by elites and 
private interests. 
 
1. Anti-corruption policy 
2. Public trust in financial honesty 
of politicians 
3. Frequency of household bribery 
 
* Table 11 is only a sample list. Please refer to the World Bank’s Worldwide Governance Indicators Web page 
(http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.asp) for the complete list. 
 
 
APPENDIX B 
 
TABLE 12. Correlation analysis (Voice and Accountability) 
Variable 
Dividend  
Payout 
Liquidity VA Liquidity*VA 
Log 
(Size) 
Log 
(ROA) 
Growth Leverage 
Dividend 
Payout 
1.000 
       
Liquidity 0.083 1.000       
VA -0.066 0.169 1.000      
Liquidity* 
-0.019 -0.024 -0.068 1.000 
    
VA 
Log (Size) 0.255 0.130 0.132 -0.115 1.000    
Log (ROA) 0.258 0.179 0.076 -0.013 -0.215 1.000   
Growth 0.105 0.074 0.031 -0.015 0.077 0.187 1.000  
Leverage -0.133 0.141 0.229 -0.002 0.203 -0.088 -0.014 1.000 
 
TABLE 13. Correlation analysis (Political Stability) 
Variable 
Dividend  
Payout 
Liquidity PS 
Liquidity*P
S 
Log 
(Size) 
Log (ROA) Growth Leverage 
Dividend  
Payout 
1.000 
       
Liquidity 0.083 1.000       
PS 0.003 -0.206 1.000      
Liquidity*PS 0.003 0.273 -0.110 1.000     
Log (Size) 0.255 0.130 -0.238 0.069 1.000    
Log (ROA) 0.258 0.179 -0.083 -0.028 -0.215 1.000   
Growth 0.105 0.074 -0.037 0.027 0.077 0.187 1.000  
Leverage -0.133 0.141 -0.161 0.029 0.203 -0.088 -0.014 1.000 
 
TABLE 14. Correlation analysis (Government effectiveness) 
Variable 
Dividend  
Payout 
Liquidity GE 
Liquidity*G
E 
Log (Size) Log (ROA) Growth Leverage 
Dividend  
Payout 
1.000 
       
Liquidity 0.083 1.000       
GE 0.018 -0.223 1.000      
Liquidity* 
-0.029 0.264 -0.187 1.000 
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Log (Size) 0.255 0.130 -0.341 0.062 1.000    
Log (ROA) 0.258 0.179 0.016 -0.060 -0.215 1.000   
Growth 0.105 0.074 -0.070 0.016 0.077 0.187 1.000  
Leverage -0.133 0.141 -0.210 0.052 0.203 -0.088 -0.014 1.000 
 
TABLE 15. Correlation analysis (Regulation Quality) 
Variable 
Dividend  
Payout 
Liquidity RQ Liquidity*RQ 
Log 
(Size) 
Log 
(ROA) 
Growth Leverage 
Dividend  
Payout 
1.000 
       
Liquidity 0.083 1.000       
RQ 0.031 -0.236 1.000      
Liquidity* 
-0.029 0.385 -0.106 1.000 
    
RQ 
Log (Size) 0.255 0.130 -0.212 -0.013 1.000    
Log (ROA) 0.258 0.179 -0.020 -0.058 -0.215 1.000   
Growth 0.105 0.074 -0.042 0.006 0.077 0.187 1.000  
Leverage -0.133 0.141 -0.222 0.030 0.203 -0.088 -0.014 1.000 
 
TABLE 16. Correlation analysis (Rule of Law) 
Variable 
Dividend  
Payout 
Liquidity RL Liquidity*RL 
Log 
(Size) 
Log 
(ROA) 
Growth Leverage 
Dividend  
Payout 
1.000 
       
Liquidity 0.083 1.000       
RL -0.004 -0.103 1.000      
Liquidity* 
-0.036 0.153 -0.219 1.000 
    
RL 
Log (Size) 0.255 0.130 -0.301 0.002 1.000    
Log (ROA) 0.258 0.179 0.119 -0.065 -0.215 1.000   
Growth 0.105 0.074 -0.056 0.004 0.077 0.187 1.000  
Leverage -0.133 0.141 -0.089 0.038 0.203 -0.088 -0.014 1.000 
 
TABLE 17. Correlation analysis (Control of corruption) 
Variable 
Dividend  
Payout 
Liquidity CC Liquidity*CC 
Log 
(Size) 
  
Log 
(ROA) 
Growth Leverage 
Dividend  
Payout 
1.000 
    
 
   
Liquidity 0.083 1.000        
CC 0.020 -0.166 1.000       
Liquidity* 
-0.039 0.249 -0.211 1.000 
 
 
   
CC 
Log (Size) 0.255 0.130 -0.226 -0.035 1.000     
Log (ROA) 0.258 0.179 0.050 -0.060 -0.215  1.000   
Growth 0.105 0.074 -0.031 0.000 0.077  0.187 1.000  
Leverage -0.133 0.141 -0.131 0.025 0.203   -0.088 -0.014 1.000 
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TABLE 18. VIF analysis (Six dimension of governance quality) 
Variable VIF 1/VIF   Variable VIF 1/VIF   Variable VIF 1/VIF 
Log (ROA) 1.16 0.86  Liquidity 1.19 0.84  Log (Size) 1.24 0.81 
Log (Size) 1.15 0.87  Log (Size) 1.18 0.84  GE 1.22 0.82 
Leverage 1.11 0.90  Log (ROA) 1.17 0.85  Liquidity 1.19 0.84 
Liquidity 1.10 0.91  PS 1.13 0.89  Log (ROA) 1.17 0.86 
VA 1.10 0.91  Liquidity*PS 1.09 0.91  Liquidity*GE 1.11 0.90 
Growth 1.05 0.95  Leverage 1.08 0.93  Leverage 1.08 0.92 
Liquidity*VA 1.02 0.98  Growth 1.05 0.95  Growth 1.05 0.95 
Mean VIF 1.10    Mean VIF 1.13    Mean VIF 1.15   
              
Variable VIF 1/VIF   Variable VIF 1/VIF   Variable VIF 1/VIF 
Liquidity 1.34 0.75  Log (Size) 1.22 0.82  Log (Size) 1.19 0.84 
Liquidity*RQ 1.21 0.82  RL 1.17 0.86  Liquidity 1.18 0.85 
Log (ROA) 1.18 0.85  Log (ROA) 1.17 0.86  Log (ROA) 1.17 0.85 
Log (Size) 1.17 0.85  Liquidity 1.12 0.89  Liquidity*CC 1.13 0.88 
RQ 1.13 0.88  Liquidity*RL 1.09 0.92  CC 1.12 0.89 
Leverage 1.10 0.91  Leverage 1.06 0.94  Leverage 1.07 0.93 
Growth 1.05 0.95  Growth 1.06 0.95  Growth 1.05 0.95 
Mean VIF 1.17    Mean VIF 1.13    Mean VIF 1.13   
 
 
